2017 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

9-20-2017

Manuel Abdale Pizarro v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017

Recommended Citation
"Manuel Abdale Pizarro v. Attorney General United States" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 916.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/916

This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 17-1268
________________

MANUEL AHMED ABDALE PIZARRO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
________________
On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar
(No. A087-099-885)
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 19, 2017
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 20, 2017)
________________
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Manuel Abdale Pizarro asks us to reverse the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) denial of a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility. We are without jurisdiction to
do so and thus dismiss his petition with respect to the BIA’s exercise of discretion and
deny it with respect to all other issues raised. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Cospito v.
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008).
I.

BACKGROUND
Pizarro first entered the United States in 1987. He later married and now has six

children, all of whom are United States citizens. Between 2002 and 2009, Pizarro worked
as a mortgage loan officer. In 2009, he was indicted on wire fraud charges for overstating
borrowers’ incomes on two mortgage loan applications. Pizarro pled guilty and the Court
sentenced him to spend 366 days in prison and to pay $370,000 as compensation for the
loss caused by the two mortgage loan foreclosures.
The wire-fraud conviction set in play a downward spiral for Pizarro. Fearing
prison, he obtained $13,000 from an acquaintance, which he claims he planned to pay
back (the record is not clear precisely how he came by the money), and absconded to
Ecuador. Pizarro reentered the United States by crossing the southern border without
authorization in 2013 and was apprehended a year later. He was subsequently convicted
of failing to appear to serve his initial wire-fraud sentence as well as embezzling the
$13,000.
In 2015 the Government began proceedings to remove Pizarro from the United
States as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii),
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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). To avoid deportation, he requested an adjustment of status,
and it is undisputed that he cannot obtain the relief he requests without the grant of a
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to INA § 212(h). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
Under INA § 212(h) waivers may be granted, among other reasons, if removal
would result in “extreme hardship” for citizens or permanent-residents who are members
of the petitioner’s immediate family. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Whether to grant a waiver
of inadmissibility is left to the discretion of the Attorney General, but immigrants who
were “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in the United States before being
“convicted of an aggravated felony” are statutorily ineligible for a waiver. Id.
The Immigration Judge assigned to Pizarro’s case held both that he was statutorily
ineligible for a waiver and that, even if he were eligible, the IJ would exercise his
discretion to deny the waiver because Pizarro’s criminal record outweighed the hardship
his family would suffer from his deportation. J.A. 16–19. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial
on the latter ground only. J.A. 4. Pizarro filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA
denied. He appeals that denial.
II.

ANALYSIS
The IJ held Pizarro had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence before he

committed an aggravated felony (i.e., wire fraud) and was thus statutorily ineligible for a
waiver of inadmissibility per INA § 212(h). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Pizarro disagrees,
arguing that because he initially entered the United States on a tourist visa he does not
trigger the statute’s ineligibility provision. We do not reach this issue, however, because
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the BIA affirmed the IJ on the independent ground that Pizarro does not merit a waiver of
inadmissibility as a matter of discretion.
Pizarro also takes issue with this second ground for denial of his waiver request.
He disagrees with the IJ and BIA’s balancing of the relevant factors in his case that bear
on whether a discretionary waiver should issue. But Congress has decreed that “our
jurisdiction does not extend to an agency’s factual and discretionary determinations
underlying the denial of waivers based on an analysis involving extreme hardship.”
Cospito, 539 F.3d at 170; accord 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Thus we cannot secondguess whether Pizarro’s particular circumstances warrant a waiver.
Finally, Pizarro contends that the IJ applied the wrong standard, requiring him to
demonstrate that his deportation would lead his family to suffer not merely “extreme
hardship” but “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h)(1)(B) with Pet’r’s Br. at 20–21. But this contention finds no support in the
record, which shows the IJ applied the appropriate “extreme hardship” standard. See J.A.
16–19.
*

*

*

*

*

Regardless whether the IJ was correct that Pizarro is statutorily barred from
receiving a waiver of inadmissibility, the IJ and BIA also determined that he should not
receive one as a matter of discretion. The record demonstrates that they applied the
proper standard to Pizarro’s request, and we lack jurisdiction to review their exercise of
discretion. Accordingly, we dismiss Pizarro’s petition for review with respect to that
exercise of discretion and deny it with respect to all other issues.
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